

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
6995 Springfield Center Drive
Springfield, VA 22150



Transportation
Security
Administration

August 1, 2025

Tracy Biggs
Deputy Chief, Disclosure Unit
Office of Special Counsel

RE: OSC File No. DI-23-000586

Dear Ms. Biggs:

The attached report is in response to your November 18, 2024 request for a follow-up investigation regarding TSA's initial Report of Investigation which was provided to OSC on July 30, 2024. The ROI addressed Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) Transportation Security Manager (TSM) [REDACTED] disclosure alleging that there was malfunctioning screening equipment at BOS. After receiving TSA's initial ROI, you requested that TSA look into the following:

1. The report fails to address the March 3, 2023, incident identified by [REDACTED] that was included in the July 20, 2023, OSC referral letter. Please provide an assessment of the AIT machines failure to alert during an exercise in which a TSA officer in the BOS FET Program [REDACTED] on March 3, 2023.
2. In his statement, [REDACTED] states that "AIT systems are used to screen passengers for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] We understand that the [REDACTED] used on March 11, 2023, was not [REDACTED] approved for AIT training, nor did it function like [REDACTED]. However, it was an approximately [REDACTED] of a person.
 - a. Please clarify why an item of [REDACTED] would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object; and
 - b. Please provide the parameters of what [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would trigger an AIT alarm.

In response to your request, the TSA Investigations Division conducted a supplemental investigation.

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

With respect to the BOS AIT's failure to alert to [REDACTED] during Transportation Security Officer (TSO) training on March 3, 2023, the investigation indicated that the TSO who walked through the AIT with [REDACTED] was wearing a jacket which is not consistent with standard operating procedures which requires passengers to divest outer garments. The investigation also indicated that prior to that timeframe, [REDACTED] used in TSA's AIT equipment nationwide was designed to detect threats while avoiding an unreasonably high number of false alarms. Information developed during deployment and field use of AIT equipment as well as threat intelligence received, led to TSA updating [REDACTED] to increase the security effectiveness of the equipment. Testing conducted by INV on February 6, 2025, confirmed the updates to the AIT [REDACTED] resolved this concern, as the AIT equipment reliably alerted to [REDACTED], using the standard TSA screening protocols.

With respect to OSC's follow-up questions regarding TSA's Report of Investigation I23-00576, dated June 27, 2024, Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that the item of a [REDACTED] would not alarm is because the Detection Standards operate off a [REDACTED]. The AIT would alert on other objects [REDACTED] that would pose a threat, such as [REDACTED] etc.

Please note that this report contains Sensitive Security Information (SSI) that is controlled under 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520, must be handled and protected accordingly, and cannot be publicly released. TSA has provided OSC with a copy of the redacted report for public release.


If you require further information regarding these matters, please do not hesitate to reach out to me.

Sincerely,

Shireen Hansen

Shireen Hansen
Deputy Chief Counsel (Acting)
Office of Chief Counsel

[REDACTED]





**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
TSA INVESTIGATIONS**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

CASE NUMBER: I23-00576

TITLE: Security Screening Equipment Vulnerability

SUBJECT(S): N/A

ALLEGATION: 5 U.S.C. §1213 allegations – (1) The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) failed to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises; and (2) Boston TSA management and the Boston Federal Security Director (FSD) failed to investigate these potential security vulnerabilities.

PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION: December 5, 2024, to March 21, 2025

CASE STATUS: Closed

INVESTIGATED BY: Special Agent [REDACTED]

REPORT BY: Special Agent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] 11:52:54
-04'00'

Special Agent in Charge
Technical Service Branch
TSA Investigations

April 1, 2025

Date

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

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- ☐ Anti-Harassment Program
- ☒ Other _____ Deputy Administrator _____
- ☐ File

Report of Investigation (ROI) Handling: The ROI and information contained herein is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552A, Public Law 93-579) and thus may not be released outside official channels. This material must be safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure, and should not be left unattended or discussed with unauthorized persons, and must be retained in a security container when not in use.

Executive Summary:

1) A summary of information with respect to which the investigation was initiated:

On December 5, 2024, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Investigations (INV) received a referral from TSA's Chief Counsel's office (CC) indicating the United States Office of Special Counsel (OSC) had requested response to follow-up questions they had after reviewing an INV Report of Investigation related to Whistleblower Disclosure, OSC File No. DI-23-000586.

Specifically, the follow-up responses requested by OSC are:

The report fails to address the March 3, 2023, incident identified by Mr. [REDACTED] that was included in the July 20, 2023, OSC referral letter. Please provide an assessment of the AIT machines failure to alert during an exercise in which a TSA officer in the BOS FET Program concealed a [REDACTED] on March 3, 2023.

In his statement, [REDACTED] states that "AIT systems are used to screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing..." We understand that the [REDACTED] used on March 11, 2023, was not a verified AIT explosive simulant approved for AIT training, nor did it function like a metallic AIT explosive simulant. However, it was an approximately [REDACTED] object situated in the [REDACTED] area of a person.

Please clarify why an item of this size would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object; and

Please provide the parameters of what "other objects concealed under layers of clothing" hidden in the [REDACTED] area would trigger an AIT alarm.

2) A description of the conduct of the investigation:

TSA INV interviewed the BOS Supervisory Transportation Security Office (STSO) who participated in the Field Evaluation Testing (FET) training involving a [REDACTED] on March 3, 2023, and Richard Burdette, General Engineer, Acquisition Program Management, as well as the former AIT Program Manager regarding the OSC's follow-up questions related to the explosive simulant used in the March 11, 2023, training. INV also conducted testing of the BOS AIT machine in question, using the same [REDACTED] that was used during the March 3, 2023, training.

3) A summary of any evidence obtained from the investigation:

With respect to the BOS AIT's failure to alert to a [REDACTED] during Transportation Security Officer (TSO) training, on March 3, 2023, the investigation indicated that the TSO who walked through the AIT with [REDACTED] was wearing a jacket which is not consistent with standard operating procedures which requires passengers to divest outer garments. The investigation also indicated that prior to that timeframe, the software and algorithm used in TSA's AIT equipment nationwide was designed to detect threats while avoiding an unreasonably high number of false alarms. Information developed during deployment and field use of AIT equipment as well as threat

intelligence received, led to TSA updating the software/algorithm to increase the security effectiveness of the equipment. Testing conducted by INV on February 6, 2025, confirmed the updates to the AIT software and screening protocols resolved this concern, as the AIT equipment reliably alerted to the [REDACTED], using the standard TSA screening protocols.

With respect to OSC's follow-up questions regarding TSA's Report of Investigation I23-00576, dated June 27, 2024, Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that the item of a size as the [REDACTED] would not alarm is because the Detection Standards operate off a "black" list concept; meaning the Detection Standards outline specific threats the system is supposed to find such as explosives, as opposed to outlining the full set of items that are authorized in the sterile area. The AIT would alert on other objects concealed under clothing that would pose a threat, such as explosives, firearms, knives, etc.

4) A listing of any violation or apparent violation of any law, rule, or regulation:

The investigation did not reveal any violation or apparent violation of any law, rule, or regulation. Appropriate notifications and TSA protocols were followed, which resulted in upgrading AIT software and clarification of what simulants and replica weapons should be used for training in conjunction with AIT equipment.

5) A description of action taken or planned as a result of the investigation:

The algorithm for the AIT has been updated and resolved any security issues that may have existed prior to the investigation.

Origin of Case:

On December 5, 2024, TSA, INV received a referral from TSA CC indicating the OSC had requested response to follow-up questions they had after receipt of an INV ROI related to Whistleblower Disclosure, OSC File No. DI-23-000586. (Exhibit 1)

Specifically, the follow-up responses requested by OSC are:

The report fails to address the March 3, 2023, incident identified by Mr. [REDACTED] that was included in the July 20, 2023, OSC referral letter. Please provide an assessment of the AIT machines failure to alert during an exercise in which a TSA officer in the BOS FET Program concealed a [REDACTED] on March 3, 2023.

In his statement, [REDACTED] states that "AIT systems are used to screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing..." We understand that the [REDACTED] used on March 11, 2023, was not a verified AIT explosive simulant approved for AIT training, nor did it function like a metallic AIT explosive simulant. However, it was an approximately [REDACTED] in object situated in the [REDACTED] area of a person.

Please clarify why an item of this size would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object; and

Allegation:

Finding:

On February 6, 2025, INV conducted a test of the BOS AIT machine that was used during the March 3, 2023, FET training, using the same [REDACTED]. This test was carried out with the assistance of the STSO who conducted the FET training on March 3, 2023. INV found the AIT, operating with updated software/algorithm, reliably detected the [REDACTED] using the standard TSA screening protocol. The [REDACTED] was concealed in the [REDACTED] area of the role players using the same protocol used in the March 3, 2023, incident. (Exhibit 5)

Allegation (follow-up questions as received by OSC):

Revised May 10, 2022

Note: This Allegation and Finding are related to the follow-up questions received by OSC in relation to ROI I23-000576, dated June 27, 2024.

Finding:

As articulated in TSA's July 24, 2024, cover memorandum signed by Holly Canevari, Deputy Administrator (former), the investigation determined that the AIT machines at BOS did not fail to detect known security threats during TSA officer training exercises and that BOS leadership conducted an immediate review of the incident and took appropriate actions in compliance with applicable SOPs. After receiving follow-up questions from OSC, TSA obtained an additional statement from [REDACTED] regarding this matter.

On January 13, 2025, TSA INV conducted a follow-up interview with the former AIT Program Manager (PM) based on OSC's follow-up questions. Regarding OSC's request to clarify why an item of the size of the [REDACTED] would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object, PM [REDACTED] stated TSA equipment is built based on TSA's Detection Standards. Those Detection Standards operate off a black-list concept as opposed to a white-list. This means that they outline the specific threats the system is supposed to find, as opposed to outlining the full set of items that are allowed to enter the secure side of an airport. TSA sent the item in question to the Transportation Security Laboratory who determined this was never a valid simulant for an AIT machine. These findings mean it does not pose a threat to aircraft safety and therefore is not on the black-list. It is TSA's goal to alarm on as few non-threat items and anatomical anomalies as possible. As a result, TSA does not assign its limited resources to fund the vendor studies that would be necessary to ascertain why a specific set of equipment does not alarm on a specific non-threat item.

With respect to OSC's question regarding the parameters of what "other objects concealed under layers of clothing" hidden in the [REDACTED] area would trigger an AIT alarm, PM [REDACTED] explained that the language is used as a catchall to include any explosives, sharps, or other items that could cause a catastrophic damage to an aircraft. (Exhibit 2)

Persons Associated with Case:

Name	Role	Title	Exhibit #
[REDACTED]	Witness	Program Manager	2
[REDACTED]	Witness	STSO	3
[REDACTED]	Witness	Role Player	4
[REDACTED]	Witness	Engineer	6

EXHIBITS	
Exhibit Number	Description
1	Memorandum of Activity (MOA): Case Origination, with attachments
2	Memorandum of Interview (MOI): Interview of [REDACTED], with attachments
3	MOI: Interview of [REDACTED], with attachments
4	MOA: Receipt of Written Statement [REDACTED], with attachments
5	MOA: Operational Test of Boston Logan AIT Equipment, with attachments
6	MOA: Consultation with [REDACTED], with attachments

EXHIBIT 1



TSA INVESTIGATIONS MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: December 5, 2024
Activity or Interview of: Office of Special counsel Follow-Up Questions	Conducted by: Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED]
	Location of Interview/Activity: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Investigations (INV)

Subject Matter/Remarks

On December 5, 2024, TSA Investigations (INV), Special Investigations Unit (SIU) was tasked with investigative follow-up from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) related to a previously submitted Report of Investigation (ROI) under this case number. (Attachment A)

Specifically, OSC requested answers to the following questions:

1. The report fails to address the March 3, 2023, incident identified by Mr. [REDACTED] that was included in the July 20, 2023, OSC referral letter. Please provide an assessment of the AIT machines failure to alert during an exercise in which a TSA officer in the BOS FET Program concealed a [REDACTED] on March 3, 2023.
2. In his statement, [REDACTED] states that “AIT systems are used to screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing...” We understand that the [REDACTED] used on March 11, 2023, was not a verified AIT explosive simulant approved for AIT training, nor did it function like a metallic AIT explosive simulant. However, it was an approximately [REDACTED] object situated in the [REDACTED] area of a person.
 - a. Please clarify why an item of this size would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object; and
 - b. Please provide the parameters of what “other objects concealed under layers of clothing” hidden in the [REDACTED] area would trigger an AIT alarm.

Case Number: I23-00576	Case Title: Security Screening Equipment Malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY (continuation sheet)

Attachments:

A. Email from Office of Special Counsel, Dated November 18, 2024

Case Number:

I23-00576

Case Title:

Security Screening Equipment Malfunction

Revised May 10, 2022

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PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552

EXHIBIT 1A

From: [REDACTED] >
Sent: Monday, November 18, 2024 2:35 PM
To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: OSC File No. DI-23-000586 (Extension of Time)

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. If you believe this is SPAM or a phishing email, contact the TSA Cyber Security Operations Center at TSA-SPAM.

[REDACTED]

Good afternoon. Thank you for your email below. We have reviewed the agency's report in this matter and have follow-up questions regarding the findings. Please provide a supplemental report responsive to the questions below.

1. The report fails to address the March 3, 2023, incident identified by Mr. [REDACTED] that was included in the July 20, 2023, OSC referral letter. Please provide an assessment of the AIT machines failure to alert during an exercise in which a TSA officer in the BOS FET Program concealed a [REDACTED] on March 3, 2023.
2. In his statement, [REDACTED] states that "AIT systems are used to screen passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing..." We understand that the [REDACTED] used on March 11, 2023, was not a verified AIT explosive simulant approved for AIT training, nor did it function like a metallic AIT explosive simulant. However, it was an approximately [REDACTED] in object situated in the [REDACTED] area of a person.
 - a. Please clarify why an item of this size would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object; and
 - b. Please provide the parameters of what "other objects concealed under layers of clothing" hidden in the [REDACTED] area would trigger an AIT alarm.

Please provide a supplemental report responsive to the questions by January 17, 2025. As always, we are available should you have any questions. Thank you.

Kind regards,
[REDACTED]

EXHIBIT 2



TSA INVESTIGATIONS

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: January 13, 2025
Activity or Interview of: [REDACTED] (Former AIT Program Manager) Deployment Coordinator Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Enterprise Support	Conducted by: Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Location of Interview/Activity: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Investigations (INV) Microsoft Teams

Subject Matter/Remarks

On January 13, 2025, TSA Investigations (INV), Special Investigations Unit (SIU) interviewed TSA Enterprise Support, Deployment Coordinator [REDACTED] who formerly served as the Program Manager for the TSA Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) program, related to follow-up questions posed by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) regarding the equipment's detection capabilities.

In summary, [REDACTED] stated the AIT equipment is designed to detect threats and some of the simulants used in Field Evaluation Team (FET) training does not cause alerts because they are inert material. The [REDACTED] simulant in question is an example of this. While visually similar to an explosive, the material is inert [REDACTED] and the AIT recognizes it is not a threat. Essentially, [REDACTED] explained that the simulant was designed for older x-ray equipment and is meant to be used as a training tool for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) and not meant to be used to test the capabilities of the AIT equipment. [REDACTED] later provided a written statement. (Attachment A)

The interview was audio recorded with a duration of 22 minutes and 20 seconds.

Attachments:

A. Written Statement of [REDACTED]

Case Number: I23-00576	Case Title: Security Screening Equipment Malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

EXHIBIT 2A



**Transportation
Security
Administration**

**Transportation Security Administration
Investigations (INV)
Statement Form**

Name: [REDACTED]	Date: 1/13/2025
Duty Assignment:	
Current Position: Deployment Coordinator, Central Region	
Pay Band: J	
Telephone Number: [REDACTED]	
Agent(s):	
I, [REDACTED], hereby make the following statement to [REDACTED], who has identified him/herself to me as a Special Agent with TSA Investigations. (Below print your Statement of facts including; WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY.)	
<p>1. Please clarify why an item of this size would not trigger an AIT alarm as an anatomical anomaly or other concealed object</p> <p>TSA equipment is built based off TSA's Detection Standards. Those Detection Standards operate off a black list concept as opposed to a white list. This means that they outline the specific threats the system is supposed to find, as opposed to outlining the full set of items that are allowed to enter the secure side of an airport. TSA sent the item in question to the Transportation Security Laboratory. They determined this was never a valid simulant for an AIT machine. These findings mean it does not pose a threat to aircraft safety and therefore is not on the black list. It is TSA's goal to alarm on as few non-threat items and anatomical anomalies as possible. As a result TSA does not assign it's limited resources to fund the vendor studies that would be necessary to ascertain why a specific set of equipment does not alarm on a specific non-threat item.</p> <p>2. Please provide the parameters of what "other objects concealed under layers of clothing" hidden [REDACTED] would trigger an AIT alarm.</p> <p>This term is used as a catchall to include any explosives, sharps, or other items that could cause catastrophic damage to an aircraft.</p>	

*****END OF STATEMENT*****

I have read this entire statement consisting of: 1 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.

I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Executed on this date: 2/19/2025

Signature:

X

For TSA INV Use Only

I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Primary Investigator:

X

For TSA INV Use Only

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Witness:

X

EXHIBIT 3



TSA INVESTIGATIONS

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: January 28, 2025
Activity or Interview of: [REDACTED] Supervisory Transportation Security Officer Boston Logan International Airport	Conducted by: Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Location of Interview/Activity: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Investigations (INV) Microsoft Teams

Subject Matter/Remarks

On January 28, 2025, TSA Investigations (INV), Special Investigations Unit (SIU) interviewed Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Supervisory Transportation Security Office (STSO) [REDACTED] via Microsoft Team regarding a Field Evaluation Testing (FET) training exercise he conducted on March 3, 2023.

In summary, [REDACTED] stated he had been the BOS FET lead at that time, and he was conducting training that involved a male role player carrying a [REDACTED] through an Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machine in order to provide Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) an opportunity to conduct sensitive area pat-down searches. [REDACTED] stated during the test in question, the male role player carried a [REDACTED] through the AIT at BOS E-2 checkpoint and the equipment did not alert on the role player's [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] as indicted by the AIT alert and therefore did not search the role player's [REDACTED] and did not locate the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] expressed that he felt this was a failure of the equipment because a [REDACTED] could be used to hi-jack an aircraft. [REDACTED] later provided a written statement. (Attachment A)

The interview was audio recorded with a duration of 10 minutes and 56 seconds.

Attachments:

A. Written Statement of [REDACTED]

Case Number: I23-00576	Case Title: Security Screening Equipment Malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

EXHIBIT 3A



Transportation
Security
Administration

Transportation Security Administration
Investigations (INV)
Statement Form

Name: [REDACTED]	Date: 2/19/2025
Duty Assignment: International Checkpoint	
Current Position: Supervisory Transportation Security Officer	
Pay Band: G	
Telephone Number: 617-893-6930	
Agent(s):	
I, [REDACTED], hereby make the following statement to [REDACTED] [REDACTED], who has identified him/herself to me as a Special Agent with TSA Investigations. (Below print your Statement of facts including; WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY.) On Thursday March 2 nd 2023 at approx. 1620 I ran a test at the International Checkpoint while the Field Evaluation Testing (FET) Team Lead. The test was the [REDACTED] test. The Role player entered the Advance Image Technology (AIT) scanner and was scanned with the feet matching the yellow prints on the floor of the AIT and the hands up like the avatar in the front that is used to help passengers positions themselves properly, the only alarm was [REDACTED] of the role player and not the expected area which would have been the [REDACTED] area. The officer on the AIT checks the role players [REDACTED] and allowed him into the sterile area. The test was deemed Invalid due to the AIT not alarming on the [REDACTED] area, which was where [REDACTED] was. The supervisor on duty was informed of the Invalid test. The test was logged as an Invalid by me. The role player involved in this test on March 2 nd , 2023, was a male transportation security officer.	

*****END OF STATEMENT*****

I have read this entire statement consisting of: 3 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.

I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Executed on this date: 2/19/2025

Signature:

2/20/2025

[Redacted Signature]

Signed by

[Redacted Name]

For TSA INV Use Only

I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Primary Investigator:

2/20/2025

X
[Redacted Signature]
Sig

For TSA INV Use Only

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Witness:

X

EXHIBIT 4



TSA INVESTIGATIONS

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: March 20, 2025
Activity or Interview of: Receipt of Written Statement of Transportation Security Officer [REDACTED]	Conducted by: Special Agent [REDACTED] TSA Investigations Special Investigations Unit
	Location of Interview/Activity: DHS/TSA Email

Subject Matter/Remarks

On March 20, 2025, TSA Investigations (INV), Special Agent [REDACTED] received a written statement from Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Transportation Security Officer [REDACTED]. The statement summarized Roudenko's recollection of participating in a Field Evaluation Testing (FET) exercise at BOS on March 3, 2023, when an Advanced Imaging Technology machine failed to detect a [REDACTED] concealed on his person. The statement included [REDACTED]'s approximate height and weight, what type of clothing he was wearing, and the location and method of concealment of the [REDACTED] on his person. (Attachment A)

Attachments:

A. [REDACTED] Written Statement, March 20, 2025

Case Number: I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

EXHIBIT 4A




**Transportation
Security
Administration**

**Transportation Security Administration
Investigations (INV)
Statement Form**

Name: [REDACTED]	Date: 3/17/2025
Duty Assignment: Boston Logan International Airport	
Current Position: Transportation Security Officer	
Pay Band:	
Telephone Number: 617-561-2700	
Agent(s): SA [REDACTED]	
I, [REDACTED] hereby make the following statement to [REDACTED] who has identified him/herself to me as a Special Agent with TSA Investigations. (Below print your Statement of facts including: WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY.)	
<p>On March 3, 2023, I was a roleplayer in a training exercise at Boston Logan Airport. I had a [REDACTED] concealed [REDACTED] I was wearing a light, form fitting sports jacket. I had on my Apple Watch Ultra. I was wearing a Columbia belt with a metal buckle. On its own the belt buckle may or may not alarm the AIT but it is unlikely to set off detection equipment to the point it would need to be divested. I did not have any items in my pockets. I was wearing Cole Haan chukka boots that I normally wear as part of my TSA uniform. At the time I was somewhere between 155-165 pounds and I am 6'1" tall. When I walked through the AIT machine it did not alarm on [REDACTED]</p>	
*****END OF STATEMENT*****	
<p>I have read this entire statement consisting of: 3 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.</p>	
<p>I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.</p>	
<p>I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.</p>	
<p>Executed on this date: Click or tap to enter a date. 3/12/25</p>	

Signature:

X




For TSA INV Use Only

I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Primary Investigator:

X



For TSA INV Use Only

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Witness:

X




EXHIBIT 5



TSA INVESTIGATIONS

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: February 6, 2025
Activity or Interview of: Test of Advanced Imaging Technology Machine	Conducted by: Special Agent [REDACTED] Location of Interview/Activity: Boston Logan International Airport – Terminal E, Lane 1 East Boston, MA, 02128

Subject Matter/Remarks

On February 6, 2025, Transportation Security Administration Investigations Special Agent [REDACTED] observed an operational test of the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) body scanner machine, located at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), Terminal E, Lane 1. The AIT machine includes selections for a male, female, or gender-neutral option for completing the body scan. In March 2023, the AIT operator could only select male or female. The algorithms were updated in May 2023, which added the gender-neutral option. The gender-neutral option is the default setting for all AIT scanners at BOS.

For the operational test, Supervisory Transportation Security Officer [REDACTED] and Screening Training Specialist [REDACTED] were used for obtaining test results of both male and female genders. For the first test, [REDACTED] positioned [REDACTED] obtained from the screening team's Field Evaluation Testing (FET) kit in his [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] followed standard screening protocols as a passenger would (i.e. removed belt, shoes, items in pockets), prior to stepping into the AIT scanner. [REDACTED] was scanned with the male option selected and the AIT machine never alarmed [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was then scanned with the gender-neutral option selected and the AIT machine alarmed [REDACTED]. (Attachment A and B)

[REDACTED] also positioned the [REDACTED] obtained from the screening team's FET kit in her [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] followed standard screening protocols as a passenger would (i.e. removed belt, shoes, items in pockets), prior to stepping into the AIT scanner. [REDACTED] was scanned with the female option selected and the AIT machine alerted [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was also scanned with the gender-neutral option selected and the AIT machine alerted [REDACTED]. (Attachment C and D)

Case Number I23-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

The screening team members explained the gender-neutral algorithm update completed in May 2023 is more sensitive than the previous male or female options. The members also stated there is a vigorous screening process for persons who have been selected for enhanced screening. These selectees are scanned with the defaulted gender-neutral setting, then they are scanned again with male or female settings, then they are patted down. This multi-step process ensures those that require additional screening are thoroughly examined before admittance into the airport's sterile area.

Attachment:

- A. Photographs of scan with male option, taken February 6, 2025.
- B. Photographs of scan with gender-neutral option (male role player), taken February 6, 2025.
- C. Photographs of scan with female option, taken February 6, 2025
- D. Photograph of scan with gender-neutral option (female role player), taken February 6, 2025

Agent notes: *This operational test replicated the test conducted on March 2, 2023. The same AIT machine was also used as the test on March 2, 2023, but all AIT machines in the airport contain the same technology.*

Case Number: 123-00576	Case Title: Security screening equipment malfunction
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Revised May 10, 2022

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EXHIBIT 5A

GENDER-NEUTRAL TEST (MALE SUBJECT; NECKLACE ON)




EXHIBIT 5B

Male Option Selected, Male Subject, Necklace off



Male Option Selected, Male Subject, Necklace on




EXHIBIT 5C




EXHIBIT 5D




EXHIBIT 6



TSA INVESTIGATIONS

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OR ACTIVITY

Type of Activity: <input type="checkbox"/> Personal Interview <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Telephone Interview <input type="checkbox"/> Records Review <input type="checkbox"/> Other	Date: March 13, 2025
Activity or Interview of: Summary of Discussion with TSA Systems Evaluation Branch Engineer [REDACTED]	Conducted by: Special Agent [REDACTED] TSA Investigations Special Investigations Unit
	Location of Interview/Activity: Microsoft Teams

Subject Matter/Remarks

On March 13, 2025, TSA Investigations (INV), Special Agent [REDACTED] consulted Engineer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] TSA Acquisitions Program Management, Testing and Evaluation Division, Systems Evaluation Branch, regarding the March 3, 2023, Boston Logan Airport Field Evaluation Testing (FET) incident during which an Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machine failed to detect a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is a subject matter expert on TSA AIT equipment.

With respect to the [REDACTED] referred to within TSA as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in summary, explained that it is a valid simulant for AIT equipment and should alert when concealed in the [REDACTED] area of a role player, under normal circumstances. [REDACTED] stated that, in general, he could only hypothesize reasons why the AIT failed to alert during the FET exercise on March 3, 2023. [REDACTED] was advised that the March 3, 2023, role player was 6'1" tall, approximately 155-165 pounds, wearing a light sports jacket and a belt with a metal buckle. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided a written statement as to the incident. (Attachment A and B)

Attachments:

- A. [REDACTED] Written Statement, March 20, 2025
- B. Images of Field Evaluation Testing [REDACTED]

Case Number:
I23-00576

Case Title:
Security screening equipment malfunction


Revised May 10, 2022

EXHIBIT 6A

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Cover Sheet



For more information on handling SSI, contact SSI@dhs.gov.

WARNING: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to persons without a "need to know", as defined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration or the Secretary of Transportation. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION



Transportation
Security
Administration

Transportation Security Administration Investigations (INV) Statement Form

Name: [REDACTED]	Date: 3/24/2025
Duty Assignment: AIT System Evaluator	
Current Position: General Engineer	
Pay Band: J	
Telephone Number: 202-306-5770	
Agent(s): [REDACTED]	
<p>I, [REDACTED], hereby make the following statement to [REDACTED], who has identified him/herself to me as a Special Agent with TSA Investigations. (Below print your Statement of facts including; WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY.)</p> <p>I, [REDACTED] have served as the System Evaluator on behalf of the Independent Test Agent (ITA) for On-Person Screening since March 2010. I am responsible for the planning and reporting of all required acquisition testing, including Certification Testing (CERT) and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) solutions. I was involved in the testing of the “Tier 2 (T2)” and “Gender Neutral Low Probability of False Alarm (GN)” algorithms that are relevant to this statement.</p> <p>On 13 March 2025 I was contacted by the identified investigator about an open inquiry relative to field reports at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS) originating 3 March 2023. This response is provided as SSI. The open investigation, as documented by Mr. [REDACTED], is based on an event where a BOS Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO) conducted a training scan with a concealed [REDACTED] in a sensitive area on the T2 algorithm and did not receive the anticipated system response. The STSO provided an email describing what he was wearing during the incident scan. He described that he was wearing a jacket that covered the target threat replica. For reference, TSA lab detection tests are typically performed while complying with established SOP divest protocols which requires divestiture of outer garments. If during actual stream of commerce, passengers are unable or unwilling to divest appropriately other forms of screening may be performed. These protocols are designed to provide the AIT technology the greatest chance of performing accurately for both detection and false alarm. Technical tests have confirmed that deviating from these protocols may cause a significant loss in detection. The guidance from these discussions is to ensure proper divestiture of outer garments per the SOP. Since the initial event, the Passenger Screening Program fielded an updated capability algorithm. This new algorithm, the Low Pfa Algorithm, will play a critical role in increasing overall security effectiveness by finding smaller threats on a person compared to previously deployed</p>	

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

algorithms, increasing the probability of detection in many areas to include the [REDACTED] area, and augmenting AIT throughput and utilization while decreasing the passenger touch rate.

Mr. [REDACTED] indicated that in a follow-up investigation of the complaint, the team observed consistent alarming under the GN algorithm and were not able to reproduce the 3 March 2023 finding.

In previous testing, the acquisition CERTs included this general threat scenario [REDACTED] for both the prior T2 as well as current GN algorithms for both AIT-1 and AIT-2 platforms adhering to proper divestiture. Performance against this scenario is considered "saturated" which in this case means all results were near 100%.

The ITA maintains a close relationship with the Operational User Representative and the Program Office through the technology lifecycle, which includes conducting additional testing on upgrades as well as assessing field reported observations. Additionally, we have the ability to support any follow-on activities as requested.

*****END OF STATEMENT*****

I have read this entire statement consisting of: 2 pages. I have been given the opportunity to make corrections. All of the information contained in this statement is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand that I may be prosecuted for perjury or making false statements if I have intentionally misrepresented anything contained in this statement. I have not intentionally omitted any information or knowledge I have that relates to the matters under investigation or review.

I swear or affirm that the testimony I have provided in this electronic statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

I certify that I am making this statement of my own free will, without any duress or coercion. The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Executed on this date: 3/24/2025

Signature:

3/24/2025

X

Sign

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

For TSA INV Use Only

I issued this Statement Form and electronically received the electronically signed record above.

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Primary Investigator:

3/24/2025

X

Signature

For TSA INV Use Only

The electronic signature below is the equivalent of my handwritten signature.

Signature of Witness:

X

EXHIBIT 6B

